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The requisites of democracy and security are sometimes in conflict. 
Upholding the rule of law and safeguarding fundamental rights and 
freedoms are the hallmarks of a consolidated twenty-first-century de-
mocracy. Yet the need to guard the nation against violent domestic or 
transnational threats has often been used as a rationale for states to skirt 
the law and limit the very rights that they claim to be protecting. Strik-
ing the right balance between freedom and safety is hard, and Latin 
America’s history of authoritarian rule and domestic political violence 
makes that region especially sensitive to the difficulty of the challenge. 
The problem is once again on the agenda as Latin American countries, 
after having recently experienced a wave of democratization, now find 
themselves awash in record levels of crime and disorder. The region is 
one of the world’s most violent, with a murder rate of 32.6 per 100,000 
people in 2008—a rate that has more than doubled since 2003 and is 
three times the global average.
In the past, Latin American governments—and particularly those of 
an authoritarian persuasion—would rationalize antidemocratic measures 
with the logic of national security: For the sake of fending off greater 
dangers, the reasoning ran, worries over human rights would have to 
be held in abeyance. Individual protections would be sacrificed for the 
collective good. Today, however, this trade-off is no longer permis-
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sible. International norms have elevated the importance of individual 
security, obliging sovereign states to consider their duty to protect each 
citizen’s well-being alongside traditional national-security interests. As 
these norms have evolved, so have groups that pose challenges to both 
national and individual security, placing people in harm’s way while 
also threatening governments and institutions. We refer to such security 
challenges as “intermediate” or “midlevel.” The threats that they pose 
lie at the intersection of national and individual security.
Large and well-organized criminal elements make citizens unsafe; 
extortionists drive shopkeepers out of business; terrorists imperil indi-
vidual and national security. In 2009, for example, murders by drug-
trafficking groups in northern Mexico mounted so high that local police 
were overwhelmed, and the government in Mexico City had to send 
more than five-thousand federal soldiers and police to Ciudad Juarez 
in a bid to stanch the bloodletting. In Jamaica the following year, the 
government sent heavily armed police and military units to retake the 
most violent areas of Kingston—its own capital—from local gangs loyal 
to the powerful drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke, resulting in the 
deaths of several dozen civilians. In El Salvador, President Carlos Mau-
ricio Funes has deployed army troops to patrol government prisons in an 
attempt to take them back from Mara Salvatrucha (known as MS-13), a 
formidable youth gang with transnational reach.
High levels of criminal violence not only make daily life more peril-
ous for common citizens, but can even challenge the viability of gov-
ernments. Massive crime-fighting efforts drain state resources, threaten 
the delivery of other public services, and place the innocent in harm’s 
way. Whole swaths of the national territory may become ungovernable 
“no-go” zones for state officials. If ordinary civil police become over-
whelmed, larger, better-equipped, and more lethal security forces may 
have to be called upon. In Latin America, this can mean citizens finding 
themselves forced into closer proximity with security forces that have a 
history of rights violations or that may be poorly trained to operate with 
the restraint that domestic laws and international norms demand.
Policy reformers and experts on Latin America have long wished to 
see military and police functions separated more clearly from one an-
other. The idea has been to “redline” certain public-security tasks so 
that they are off-limits to the military, save for rare exceptions during 
national emergencies. Public security, so the argument goes, is primar-
ily a police function, while the armed forces should be reserved for mis-
sions such as international peacekeeping and defense against foreign 
invasion. Advocates of police reform want to push law-enforcement 
agencies toward a community-policing model, placing a premium on 
empathetic interaction and cooperation with citizens.1 
Both these reform trajectories, however, leave nations vulnerable to 
those increasingly common midlevel threats that far surpass the capa-
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bilities of a community-based police force. The simultaneous push to 
demilitarize public-safety functions and decentralize police forces risks 
creating an internal-security gap that many states are unprepared to han-
dle. This gap in turn poses risks to both individual security and democ-
racy in Latin America. Existing police and military structures thus face 
an enormous difficulty in meeting local security requirements. The most 
effective means for confronting the threat posed by violent nonstate ac-
tors to democracies across the region may be some type of hybrid force 
that combines the advantages of military formations with those of the 
civil police.
 The Reality of Midlevel Threats 
By minimizing the effects of time and distance and easing access to 
high technology, globalization has sapped states’ ability to maintain ef-
fective sovereignty over their national territories and placed ever more 
powerful tools in the hands of nonstate actors. Economic liberalization 
has reduced state capacity and increasingly left functions formerly per-
formed by governments to the private sector and civil society. Nowhere 
is this more true than in the developing world, where resources are 
scarce and governments have been quick to shed certain tasks and roles 
in the name of economizing. Nonstate actors now have capabilities once 
only available to states—to influence populations, provide governance 
services, organize transnational social and economic networks, and raise 
funds and gather resources from across the globe. At the same time, 
governments and states have become less and less adept at providing 
public goods or controlling their borders. When nonstate actors use such 
capabilities to organize violence, threat levels can exceed the capacities 
of traditional police forces.2
Increasingly, the real risk to both individual and national security is 
found at the intermediate level: violent, well-organized nonstate actors 
that operate across state boundaries increasingly softened by globaliza-
tion.3 These midlevel threats can be found between common crime at 
the low end and insurgencies (guerrilla or otherwise) at the high end. 
They include powerful youth gangs, transnational criminal-trafficking 
organizations, and terrorists. Some of these elements are extremely vio-
lent, well armed, and well funded. They operate in and around densely 
populated areas and compete with each other for control over drugs, 
contraband, illicit enterprises, and (often) territory. 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). The most dangerous 
TCOs, such as the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels in Mexico, have equipped 
themselves with military-style munitions. They boast paramilitary units, 
funded by the huge drug revenues that the cartels bring in annually—
US$18 to $39 billion, according to U.S. Department of Justice as-
sessments of Colombian and Mexican drug-trafficking outfits.4 These 
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paramilitary units are not capable of defending territory against the full 
power of a national army, but they can pose a serious threat even to 
military forces. Although large cartels such as those famously associ-
ated with the cities of Medellin and Cali are now rare in Colombia, 
smaller family-run drug-trafficking groups still boast serious revenues 
and firepower, and Colombian narcotraficantes have proven capable of 
feats such as building dozens of their own drug-smuggling submarines.5 
Some TCOs in northern Mexico recruit former members of the armed 
forces, with the ranks of the Los Zetas cartel being drawn largely from 
Mexican army special-forces units. As U.S. efforts to stop drug ship-
ments through the Caribbean have become more successful, trafficking 
via land routes in Central America has burgeoned, bringing with it vio-
lent competition for control of key corridors across the long U.S. border 
with Mexico. Since Mexico’s long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary 
Party lost power in 2000, successive governments have taken a more 
active role against drug traffickers—leading to violent confrontations 
between the government and organized crime, including direct attacks 
on police and military units and a campaign of assassinations against 
federal and local officials. 
Maras and gangs. The maras in Central America and criminal youth 
gangs across Latin America and the Caribbean boast larger member-
ships than the security forces in their host countries—there are more 
than 65,000 gang members all told, according to the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime.6 These gangs can be distinguished from traditional 
organized-crime entities by the lack of a distinct hierarchy, horizon-
tally distributed power structures, their members’ young ages, and the 
groups’ relative lack of capital and organization. They frequently fund 
themselves through street-level drug distribution, racketeering, and traf-
ficking in stolen goods, although some also have connections to tradi-
tional organized-crime syndicates. Jamaica has long been affected by 
violent youth gangs that are heavily involved in drug trafficking and 
hold territorial sway over important locales, including parts of Kings-
ton. With a population of only about 2.8 million, Jamaica experienced 
more than 1,600 murders in 2008, many attributed to gang activity. The 
maras of Central America also differ from traditional youth gangs in 
having ties to counterparts in other countries, particularly the United 
States. They forged these connections mostly through the shared expe-
rience of incarceration in the United States followed by deportation to 
their home countries. While ordinary criminals act and react on their 
own for the most part, gangs and syndicates have learned how to deploy 
guerrilla-like hit-and-run tactics against military and police installations 
and civilian targets. 
Terrorists and other groups employing terrorist tactics. Although 
Latin America has not been thought of as a hotbed of terrorism in recent 
years, the number of organizations using terrorist tactics, particularly in 
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urban areas, is notable. These include traditional rural-based insurgen-
cies—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) in the 2000s and the 
Shining Path in Peru in the 1980s, for example—that have resorted to 
terror tactics in cities, where their support is relatively sparse. Drug-
trafficking organizations also have waged terror campaigns when threat-
ened by the state. Pablo Escobar in Colombia in the 1980s and Mexican 
drug-trafficking organizations in the 2000s both used terror tactics such 
as urban bombings and assassinations of civilians and government of-
ficials. Central American maras have sometimes targeted civilians in or-
der to pressure governments that have implemented mano dura (“firm-
hand”) anticrime policies. For example, at the time of this writing in late 
2010, El Salvadoran gangs had set fire to more than fifty buses, and a 
single attack in June had left eighteen civilians dead. In addition, trans-
national terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah sponsored attacks in 
Argentina against Israeli and Israeli-associated targets during the 1990s 
and continue to raise funds in Paraguay to pay for activities in Lebanon. 
Because of the nature of the attacks (and sometimes because of how ter-
rorism is categorized as a crime under domestic law), such threats are 
the responsibility of police or police-intelligence organizations.
“No-Go” Zones
Intermediate threats have grown worse because some Latin American 
states lack effective sovereignty over parts of their national territories. 
In Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, the state has never governed the moun-
tainous rural hinterlands, and violent nonstate actors have long filled 
the gap. In other cases, relatively strong states have governance gaps in 
certain areas, resulting in unregulated urban communities such as the 
favelas (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro or the villas miseria (slums) of 
Buenos Aires Province. In these “no-go” zones, violent actors actually 
play a role in providing public goods, sometimes in collusion with local 
politicians and even the police themselves. Similarly, certain periods of 
time—particularly the night—may lie beyond effective state regulation, 
allowing ungoverned spaces in which criminal elements thrive. Yet, as 
Phil Williams, a leading expert on transnational organized crime, has 
argued, a number of these spaces are not ungoverned; rather, these zones 
are hotly contested between states and violent nonstate actors, creating 
particular dangers for ordinary residents, who are subject to predation 
and denied their constitutionally guaranteed civil and human rights.7
Because ungoverned spaces provide safe haven for lethal nonstate ac-
tors, they pose a potential threat not only to national security but also to 
individual citizens’ security. When such areas are contested by the state, 
the risk to citizen security grows if state forces neither effectively con-
front intermediate-level threats nor operate within the democratic rule of 
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law.8 It is this gap in capabilities that allows midlevel threats to flourish, 
yet the legacy of Latin America’s repressive, authoritarian past has led 
politicians and citizens to resist developing the appropriate public-order 
institutions to fill the void—the bad memories of not-so-long-ago “dirty 
wars” and hit squads remain strong.
Midlevel challengers place de-
mocracies in a special predicament. 
State security forces must be for-
midable enough to counter these 
threats—whose networks, arms, and 
general level of lethality far exceed 
what law enforcement is accustomed 
to facing from ordinary criminals—
yet responses must respect the rule 
of law and other democratic norms 
that restrain the use of force. Thus 
the security forces must balance 
firmness and the ability to act swiftly and lethally with careful judgment 
and discrimination in the use of such capabilities. 
Arguably, no state can truly adhere to a democratic rule of law with-
out applying it to all its armed forces, whether police or military. After 
all, it is the state’s military and police forces that enable it to implement 
its claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory. 
But these are the agencies with the greatest capacity to inflict harm—
they could crush the rights and freedoms of citizens in a heartbeat—and 
thus they must themselves be subject to especially rigorous standards of 
restraint, control, and accountability.
Too often in the past, the claim to be applying force legitimately 
has been violated. Obviously during periods of de facto rule, military 
and police agents operated outside the legitimacy conferred by consti-
tutional government. But even since the transition from de facto to de 
jure regimes in many Latin American states, security agents have been 
known to trample upon the rights of suspects and prisoners alike with-
out suffering any consequences. As Juan E. Méndez observed in 1999, 
“An indisputable feature of the kind of democracy that Latin America 
offers at the end of this century is that violent and illegitimate behavior 
by state actors is so pervasive that it is part of the ordinary way of doing 
business by many law enforcement bodies.”9
In theory, police are supposed to protect and serve the public while 
upholding and enforcing the law.10 In practice, Latin American law en-
forcement has often skirted the law and even crossed the line into crimi-
nality, corruption, and rampant violence. Running drug operations and 
prostitution rings, committing extrajudicial killings and kidnappings, 
and abusing detainees have become familiar police practices in a number 
of Latin American countries. Opportunities for these activities abound, 
Running drug operations 
and prostitution rings, 
committing extrajudicial 
killings and kidnappings, 
and abusing detainees have 
become familiar police 
practices in a number of 
Latin American countries.
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as do such motives as poor pay, poor training, and the knowledge that 
such transgressions will likely go unpunished.
The police also tend to be rigidly hierarchical, prone to following 
orders from above rather than responding to citizen appeals from be-
low.11 In many countries, the police mimic the military in terms of ranks, 
formations, and attitudes, and often view the public in a hostile manner. 
Yet for all their similarities to the military in terms of structure, police 
forces in Latin America lack military capacity. They have neither the 
organizational strength, the intelligence-gathering ability, nor the fire-
power needed to confront the more lethal midlevel challengers. Thus, 
while the police may have a reputation for being violent, they are also 
ineffective. They do not use intelligence to discern, disarm, and demo-
bilize criminal organizations. Instead, they are notorious for lashing out 
and rounding up “suspects” who are either coerced into false confes-
sions or “eliminated” before entering the criminal-justice system. These 
shows of force are, above all, expressions of police frustration and futil-
ity. Police actions do not weaken the capacity of organized syndicates, 
and they do not lower crime rates. For example, in El Salvador, the 
mano dura policies implemented in 2003 granted police greater powers 
to clamp down on MS-13. The new powers did nothing to stem the vio-
lence, however. Instead, the years 2003 to 2006 actually saw the coun-
try’s murder rate climb from 32 to 57 per 100,000.12 Similar trends can 
be observed in Brazil, Guatemala, and Mexico. 
The military has been only episodically involved in anticrime opera-
tions in Latin America, although this has been more common in certain 
regions (Central America) and countries (Brazil). When police forces 
are overwhelmed by midlevel challengers, governments on occasion 
ask their militaries to step in. Here, two aspects of the democratic rule 
of law butt up against each other—accountability and restraint. When 
crime escalates, as it has in recent years throughout Latin America, vot-
ers pressure their political leaders to adopt “get tough” policies. In cities 
and countries where insecurity is at its greatest, citizens want—in fact, 
demand—that leaders do whatever is necessary to lower crime and vio-
lence. For those governments, accountability to an electorate has meant 
having to supplement police forces with army units, even if temporarily. 
Surveys of Central Americans indicate that the sight of troops patrolling 
city streets is popular.13
For armies, accountability means answering to their political over-
seers by fulfilling the anticrime missions handed to them. The introduc-
tion of the armed forces does not mean that the military, indifferent to its 
political overseers, takes matters into its own hands. These kinds of op-
erations are circumscribed by presidential orders, defense and security 
laws, state-of-siege provisions, and congressionally imposed time lim-
its. Rather than assume full law-enforcement powers to conduct arrests, 
searches, seizures, and so on, soldiers patrol alongside police officers as 
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force multipliers, raising the number of agents on hand to deter crime 
by their very presence. Yet there are new doubts as to the effective-
ness of this approach, and the Mexican government has recently shifted 
anticrime operations in the north from the army’s control to that of a 
retrained and reorganized federal police force.
Even when they stay within these mission guidelines and even when 
there is no mission creep, the armed forces run up against another prob-
lem: inadequate training. In the best of cases, soldiers are taught to apply 
proportional force within the guidelines laid down by the laws of war, 
but with the objective of destroying enemies rather than prosecuting 
them. Their mission is to defend territory and defeat adversaries rather 
than to protect and serve the public. Deploying army units in anticrime 
or antidrug operations in densely populated zones—often alongside po-
lice units—is inviting trouble because militaries resist being compelled 
to abide by the principles of minimal use of force and due process, which 
are thought to interfere with combat effectiveness. In fact, when profes-
sional armies from developed countries conduct long-term public-order 
and counterinsurgency missions, they undergo specialized training that 
is quite different from the training that they receive to fight conventional 
foes.14 
When the military complies with a politician’s order to participate 
in anticrime operations, it is abiding by principles of civilian control. 
Likewise, the politician issuing the order has reacted legitimately and 
democratically to the public’s understandable insistence on strong gov-
ernment action against criminals. The irony is that citizens who call 
for anticrime crackdowns may be risking insecurity from another direc-
tion if politicians turn to the army to beef up the overmatched police. 
Democratic leaders must take great care to ensure that their responses to 
citizen appeals for security do not end up inadvertently eroding the rule 
of law by throwing military forces into matters for which they are not 
trained. That said, the trade-off between greater political accountability 
and less restraint on the part of security forces is one that many citizens 
in the region seem prepared to accept.15 
The Reformers’ Plea 
It has been exceedingly difficult for Latin American governments to 
get their security forces—military and police alike—to respond to inter-
nal-security threats in a manner that is at once accountable, respectful 
of the democratic rule of law, and effective. The very agents who have 
been asked to assure citizens’ security have often made citizens more 
insecure. Not surprisingly, therefore, advocates of military reform have 
argued that the armed forces’ role in public security should be greatly 
reduced or eliminated entirely. It is perhaps more surprising that many 
generals would likely agree—not only because the military may cause 
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unintended harm to the populations with whom it comes into contact, 
but also because such operations can do damage to the military institu-
tion itself. The creation of a constabulary military—one in which sol-
diers assume policing roles—could perilously distract it from its more 
vital missions, pull it away from combat-related training routines, leave 
it ill prepared to fulfill its primary constitutional mission of territorial 
defense, and expose it to corruption at the hands of organized crime. 
From this perspective, it seems best to take the military out of public 
security as much as possible so that it may focus its attention on defense 
and peacekeeping missions.
Advocates of police reform have consistently pushed for community-
policing models in recent decades. By this, they mean the demilitariza-
tion, decentralization, and democratization of police structures.16 They 
advocate replacing authoritarian hierarchies with more individual dis-
cretion, a flatter command-and-control structure, smaller units closer 
to the populations whom they police, and greater restraint on the use 
of force. Although the police are by definition an instrument of the 
state, when operating in a democratic manner community-oriented po-
lice forces respond to citizen needs and requirements first and to the 
dictates of state authorities second. A democratic police force is one 
that develops partnerships with members of the community in order to 
identify and solve problems in a cooperative manner. Such forces have 
intimate local knowledge; they know the communities that they patrol. 
Perhaps most important, democratic police are trained to use force with 
restraint and “only when strictly necessary,” as stipulated by the UN 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement.17 Because police are supposed 
to act as protectors, they must take care to minimize risks to citizens by 
carrying lighter arms and following careful rules of engagement. Those 
rules include applying principles of necessity (react violently only when 
attacked violently), proportionality (scale responses to the intensity, 
duration, and magnitude of the aggression), rationality (take nonlethal 
measures first and do not provoke an escalation of violence), and dis-
crimination (distinguish between the violent and those who are not).
It is commendable that Latin American reformers desire their po-
lice forces to be more humane and democratic and to focus on serving 
the communities that they patrol. It is equally commendable to have 
military forces focused on outside threats and providing the best de-
fense that they can for their countries. The conundrum facing leaders 
is that as midlevel threats continue to rise, the aforementioned policy 
prescriptions leave an increasingly large security void. A thoroughly 
democracy-friendly force devoted to community policing may not be 
the best counter to threats from large, highly lethal, and well-organized 
groups. Community policemen could not defend a neighborhood, let 
alone a city, besieged by a large, well-armed drug cartel, criminal gang, 
or terrorist organization. A democratic community police force would 
48 Journal of Democracy
stand no chance against the formidable security threats plaguing Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico, or Guatemala City, Guatemala. Such a force thrust into 
these types of situations would, in addition to placing citizens in harm’s 
way, be in grave danger itself.
Yet on the occasions when the armed forces do intervene, they typi-
cally do so without training specific to this type of duty. The interesting 
point here is that neither Latin America’s politicians nor its reformers 
nor its militaries want to see the armed forces embark on vigorous con-
stabulary-training programs that might actually equip them to conduct 
anticrime assignments in a more effective and humane manner. Reform-
ers would rather see the military simply leave public-security work alto-
gether, and soldiers tend to look down on police work as inferior or even 
demeaning.18 If called upon to assist police efforts, they prefer to occupy 
rearguard positions, lending equipment and logistical support but little 
else to aid law enforcement. 
There is another reason why reformers and political leaders alike 
are wary about granting the military a license to prepare for heterodox 
internal-security challenges: Although these threats are different from 
those of the 1960s and 1970s, they are still situated mainly within na-
tional borders and thus would lead the military again to look inward 
for its primary mission. Governments that grow serious about retooling 
their militaries to take on midlevel security threats will have to put in 
place and enforce new and ongoing training regimens. Once entrenched, 
those routines will become part of the armed forces’ culture, justifying 
a new force structure and possibly shifting from a temporary mission 
to a permanent role, making extrication in the future all the more dif-
ficult.19 Thus fearful that such training could be misused in the future in 
the name of internal security, governments much prefer not to allow the 
military to take that fateful first step. 
Yet reluctance either to militarize the police or constabularize the 
military leaves Latin American countries facing a severe security vacu-
um in which dangerous elements can operate with near impunity. To fill 
that void, governments may have to develop hybrid forces that do not 
answer to either the police or military (or carry their historical baggage), 
but rather have their own structure, hierarchy, mission, and training. 
Such forces would have to balance the requisites of security with the 
protection of fundamental human rights. 
Addressing the Security Gap
Hybrid forces that combine the most relevant features of the military 
(force and deployment capacity) and the police (local knowledge and re-
spect for due process), but are beholden to neither, present the best solu-
tion to the security gap. The basic requirements for such forces are that 
they be national in scope, centrally administered, geographically distrib-
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uted, and capable of mobilizing and deploying appropriately equipped 
units to meet midlevel threats—all within the democratic rule of law. 
It is key that such agencies be national in scope because many of the 
intermediate-level threats, such as organized crime and drug-trafficking 
organizations, cross jurisdictional lines in search of capacity gaps in 
law-enforcement presence. A national-level force is best positioned to 
access available intelligence and resources to defeat such threats. 
Centralized administration will ensure uniform training and prepa-
ration in law-enforcement methods, due-process requirements, and hu-
man-rights standards, as well as in the use of lethal and nonlethal force. 
This runs somewhat counter to the logic of community policing, which 
tailors law enforcement to the particular circumstances of neighbor-
hoods. Centralization here is critical, however, because a hybrid force 
can operate at much higher levels of lethality. Therefore, the state must 
take extra care to ensure that officers have received the highest levels of 
training and that they will act with restraint and within the rule of law. 
It is also important to run a centralized internal-affairs system capable 
of policing the behavior of the hybrid force so as to shield it from the 
corrupting influences of local criminals or other agents of influence and 
to allow it to be monitored by civil and political society. 
The nationwide distribution of units will help them to incorporate 
some of the successful elements of community policing such as atten-
tion to local citizens’ concerns and improved criminal intelligence. By 
being embedded in key communities or regions while also being central-
ly coordinated, geographically distributed hybrid forces can contribute 
to developing a holistic, sophisticated picture of midlevel threats, which 
will also help local police-force efforts.
Finally, the capability for rapid deployment (or a “surge” capacity) 
will allow national authorities to mobilize hybrid forces to meet inter-
mediate threats that have overwhelmed local community-oriented police 
units. This is central to the effectiveness of hybrid forces since it allows 
the state to gather well-trained units with the right equipment in areas 
where key threats exist. If hybrid forces are tied down in particular lo-
cales due to lack of mobility or supplies, they will never be able to fulfill 
their main function of reinforcing public order when it is under attack 
from large, well-organized, and violent nonstate actors.
A number of different configurations in Latin America have been used 
to achieve the objective of filling the security gap in the middle. These 
include centralized national police forces in Colombia and Peru, federal 
law-enforcement agencies focusing on counterterrorism and organized 
crime in Brazil and Mexico, and the Carabineros and Gendarmes in Chile 
and Argentina, respectively. Each has struggled to achieve the right mix 
of force generation and law enforcement. Some fall short of being true 
hybrid forces and suffer from other shortcomings. The national police 
forces in Colombia and Peru, for example, benefit from centralization 
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and a national scope but lack surge capacity. Specialized counterterror 
and antidrug law-enforcement agencies in Mexico and Brazil may field 
some highly effective units, but they are generally too small to deal with 
the large-scale, organized criminal violence that they encounter in cer-
tain pockets in Ciudad Juarez or Rio de Janeiro. 
The Carabineros of Chile and the Argentine National Gendarmer-
ie come closest to functioning as true hybrid forces that combine the 
lethality and mobility of armies with the restraint and respect for due 
process of law-enforcement agencies. This model, adapted from the 
Spanish Civil Guard, the Italian Carabinieri, and the French National 
Gendarmerie, has the best reputation for professionalism, restraint, and 
public support—at least in the form that it has taken in Chile and Argen-
tina.20 In Europe, this type of hybrid force has proven adept at dealing 
with terrorism and organized crime, and in the Southern Cone has also 
proved to be competent at handling domestic civil disturbances. 
The Chilean Carabineros are a police force with a military character. 
As law enforcers, they are charged with maintaining public order and 
security by preventing, deterring, and investigating crime. They have a 
military rank structure, and are equipped and trained to deal with lethal 
opponents. During a conventional war, the Carabineros may be asked 
to join in the defense of the nation. Domestically, they may need to 
respond to organized criminal elements. Although the Carabineros are 
administratively dependent on the Defense Ministry, they do not answer 
operationally to the armed forces during peacetime. They have their own 
organic law, hierarchy, personnel, uniforms, housing, training programs, 
and officer schools. 
Numbering some 43,000 men and women in uniform, the Carabine-
ros are a centralized, national force, with representation in each of the 
nation’s fifteen regions and 54 provinces. With this territorial reach, 
they can be quickly deployed to respond to public-security emergencies 
in any given locale. From the top down, the Carabineros subdivide into 
geographical units of decreasing size. Commands issued from the head-
quarters in Santiago are uniformly disseminated nationwide to these 
units. This structure avoids the coordination problems found in coun-
tries with multiple police forces plagued by overlapping, if not compet-
ing, jurisdictions among federal, state, and local authorities. 
Top-Down Reform
Highly centralized, top-down institutions are often prone to rigidity, 
and this is true of the Carabineros. But the offsetting advantage is that, 
once reforms are set in motion at the top, they can be more easily en-
forced in the ranks below. The Carabineros have implemented a series 
of striking reforms that have transformed them from the aloof, highly re-
pressive force that they were under the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90) 
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into the more restrained, law-abiding agency that they are today. They 
set high professional standards for themselves, tolerate no corruption, 
and require officers to take courses on law and human rights in the acad-
emy. They embed themselves inside neighborhoods where they attempt 
to forge closer ties with residents in hopes of gaining enough of their 
trust to improve crime reporting. 
They have also been influenced by sweeping reforms to the crimi-
nal-justice system that provide for greater transparency and protections 
for detainees, the accused, and the victims: Required attorney-prisoner 
visitation has helped to deter police abuse of detainees; trials are now 
open to the public and include questioning of police officers; and civil-
ian public prosecutors are assigned to oversee criminal cases that were 
once solely the purview of the police. As a result of these changes, the 
Carabineros have earned a significant measure of public trust. A victim-
ization survey conducted in Chile indicated that the Carabineros enjoy 
widespread legitimacy and are perceived to be responsive, disciplined, 
efficient, and fair in their treatment of citizens.21 
Similarly, the Argentine National Gendarmerie has recently earned 
praise for its respectful, law-abiding conduct. Like the Carabineros, it 
has its own statute, structure, personnel, and training. It serves the cause 
of national defense and public security and does everything from patrol-
ling the borders to confronting organized crime and narcotraffickers to 
handling disruptions of public order when the police have been over-
whelmed. It has won particular commendation for its handling of public 
disturbances organized by the piqueteros (picketers), jobless demonstra-
tors who have blockaded strategic roads and bridges in metropolitan 
areas. It employed restrained force to disband the blockades and treated 
the piqueteros as citizens rather than enemies. The Gendarmerie is capa-
ble of addressing community concerns and enforcing uniform standards 
of conduct because it is a national-level force with police-style training 
whose bases are geographically dispersed. At the same time, however, it 
has military-style capabilities to surge units and deploy significant force 
to meet unexpected threats.
The use of hybrid forces to fill the security gap that we have identified 
here clearly demands more research, and the growing threat in certain 
states has only added urgency to the debate. In Mexico, proposals for 
meeting the escalating menace from drug cartels increasingly favor the 
creation of a national police force to replace state and local units. In Mex-
ico and elsewhere, the debate over whether such hybrid forces should be 
created ab nihilo or drawn from existing forces will continue. For many of 
Latin America’s smaller countries, there will be clear trade-offs between 
costs and capabilities. Other states, meanwhile, will not view the security 
void as dangerous enough to warrant the creation of a new institution.
There is a central tension between democracy and security in Latin 
America, a region that is increasingly imperiled by violent and well-
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organized nonstate actors. Attempts to make police and military forces 
more compatible with democratic society may lead some states to ignore 
the greatest security threats likely to affect them today, leaving them ill 
prepared to confront the new dangers. Democracies want their militar-
ies to remain under firm civilian control and directed away from (rather 
than toward) civil society. Democracies want their law-enforcement 
bodies to respond first and foremost to the needs of citizens rather than 
to the police hierarchy. The pursuit of these goals is commendable, but 
must be accompanied by a strategy for dealing with the midlevel threats 
that we have identified. If not, reform efforts will simply leave average 
citizens more exposed to violent nonstate actors who will operate un-
impeded. Reformers must move in a new direction if midlevel security 
challenges are to be met. Neither a democratic-policing model nor a 
classic territorial defense nor a military peacekeeping-force model will 
be helpful. Hybrid security forces, however, stand a good chance of 
bridging the gap between preserving democratic values and keeping the 
polity and its people safe. 
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